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The avowed purpose of the new premerger notification and wait-
ing period requirements under section 7a of the Clayton Act' is to give
the antitrust enforcement agencies adequate information and time to
seek preliminary relief prior to an anticompetitive merger or acquisi-
tion.' Congress was unhappy with the results of the existing notifica-
tion program, as the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice
Department had been unsuccessful in halting anticompetitive mergers
prior to consummation.' After completion of the merger, divestiture
was often an inadequate remedy: either the separation of merged assets
was impractical after a period of protracted litigation, or the acquiring
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
7he Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975- Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1975-76)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings];
H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2637 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT];
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977) [hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN];
Note, Preliminary Injunctions and the Enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 771 (1965) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U.L. REV. Note].
1. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). The regulations under the statute became effective on September
5, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 36,054 (1978). As of the end of 1978, 345 merger filings had been com-
pleted, and the Justice Department, in cooperation with the Federal Trade Commission, was in-
vestigating 38 of these cases. Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1978, at 4, col. 3.
2. HOUSE REPORT 5 ("H.R. 14580 will... strengthen the enforcement of Section 7 by
giving the government antitrust agencies a fair and reasonable opportunity to detect and investi-
gate large mergers of questionable legality before they are consummated. The government will
thus have a meaningful chance to win a premerger injunction").
3. Id. 8; Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 58 (introductory remarks of Senator Hart); id. 76 (state-
ment of Sen. Haskell) ("The present merger review process simply does not work. The FTC and
the Justice Department may not receive any notice of an impending merger"); id. 502-03 (state-
ment of Joseph F. Brodley, Professor of Law, Indiana University) ("I have cited a study showing
that in the period 1955-71, which is the big merger activity period, there were 167 merger suits and
only 15 preliminary injunctions").
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company had milked the acquired firm of technology, trade secrets,
customers or liquidity during the interim.4 In either case, restoration of
the acquired firm as a viable competitor was impossible; the identities
of the merging firms had become inextricably tangled. With Title II of
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,5 Congress in-
tended to cut this Gordian knot before it was tied by facilitating the
procedural aspects of preliminary injunctive relief in antimerger cases. 6
The standards governing preliminary relief against alleged anti-
trust violations are currently in a state of flux, as the federal courts have
moved toward liberalization of the traditional standards controlling
this type of equitable relief. Aware of the complexities involved in an-
titrust litigation, the courts of equity have generally sought to maintain
the status quo until final decision on the merits.' Although the courts
have traditionally refused to issue preliminary injunctions without a
showing that the government is likely to succeed at trial and that the
balance of hardships favors the government,' both these standards have
been and are still being relaxed in antitrust cases.9 Further, the two
standards, often held to be distinct and applied sequentially, are in-
creasingly being melded, with the strength of the showing on one test
affecting the showing required on the other. 10
The purposes of this Comment are first, to show that the courts are
moving away from traditional standards for preliminary injunctions in
antitrust cases, with an identifiable trend toward an automatic ap-
proach in merger cases; and second, to discuss the influence of the new
report-and-wait requirements in the courts and to examine the possible
effects of the statute on the uncertain state of the law. The stakes are
4. HousE REPORT 8-10 ("During the course of the post-merger litigation, the acquired
firm's assets, technology, marketing systems, and trademarks are replaced, transferred, sold off, or
combined with those of the acquiring firm. Similarly, its personnel and management are shifted,
retrained, or simply discharged"); Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 76 (statement of Sen. Haskell); id. 82
(statement of Thomas Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). The premerger notification measure was enacted as part of a
compromise antitrust bill introduced by Senators Hart and Scott and Representative Rodino.
Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
6. In addition to the bill's notification and waiting period requirements, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a(f(B) (1976) provides that the government's "motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set
down for hearing by the district judge ... at the earliest practicable time, shall take precedence
over all matters except older matters of the same character and trials pursuant to section 3161 of
Title 18, and shall be in every way expedited."
7. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 329, at 139 (1978); Schneiderman, Prelim-
inary Relief in Clayton Act Section 7 Cases, 42 ANTrrRUST L.J. 587, 587 (1973); Note, Civil Proce-
dure-The Fourth Circuit's LiberalApproach to Preliminary Injunctions, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
103, 114-16 (1977).
8. See SULLIVAN § 215, at 670. See note 17 infra and text accompanying notes 13-17 infra.
9. See notes 18 & 22 infra and text accompanying notes 7 supra and 18-26 infra.
10. See notes 18-22 infra and and accompanying text.
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high in antimerger litigation: granting preliminary relief may lead to
abandonment of the merger;" denying such relief may cause the plain-
tiff to drop the suit.12 The dollar values involved are often astronomi-
cal, and the potential impact of the new legislation is considerable.
I. A BROADENING OF EQUITY'S TRADITIONS
Courts have traditionaly been cautious in granting a remedy as
drastic as the preliminary injunction. 13 Under the traditional formula
the plaintiff bears a heavy burden, as he must convince the court that
(1) there is a significant threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if
the injunction is not granted;
(2) the plaintiff will probably succeed on the merits;
(3) the balance between the irreparable harm to the plaintiff and
the injury that granting the injunction would inflict on the de-
fendant weighs in favor of the plaintiff; and
(4) the public interest favors granting the injunction.1 4
In Clayton Act suits brought by the government, the first requirement
is ordinarily eliminated on the assumption that Congress, in authoriz-
ing the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission to seek
preliminary injunctions, has determined that irreparable injury to the
public will always result from the proscribed anticompetitive conduct.' 5
By similar reasoning, the third and fourth requirements are fused into
one in government suits: the test is one of balancing the public interest
in preventing anticompetitive behavior against the public and private
11. Mergers were abandoned after preliminary relief was granted in FTC v. Food Town
Stores, Inc., 547 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d
Cir. 1963); United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 71,311 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964). SULLIVAN § 215, at 669 n.2. See
Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 513 (statement of Professor Joseph F. Brodley); Lewis, Preliminary In-
junctions in Government Section 7 Litigation, 17 ANTITRUST BULL 1, 7 (1972); Schneiderman,
supra note 7, at 598.
12. The government dropped its action after failing to obtain a preliminary injunction in
United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 321 F.2d 534 (9th
Cir.), application forpreliminary injunction denied, 84 S. Ct. 4 (1963) (per Goldberg, J., in cham-
bers) (not officially reported). SULLIVAN § 215, at 669 n.3.
13. 11 C. WRirHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2948, at 428-29
(1973).
14. Id. § 2948, at 430-3 1. Wright and Miller characterize these as the "four most important
factors." Id. 430.
15. See e.g., FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot,
547 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977) (Food Town abandoned the merger prior to a hearing on the merits);
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United Statesv. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a'dsub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986
(1971); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968); United
States v. Crocker-Anglo Natl Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1963); United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 247 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Mo. 1962), aft'd, 382 U.S. 12 (1965). See Develop-
ments in Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1059 (1965).
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injury likely to result from the injunction.'6 In weighing the equities,
the courts must also consider the adequacy of less drastic remedies.' 7
In sum, the test that the government must satisfy is twofold: it must
demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits at full hearing and
that the balance of the equities is in its favor.
Over the past decade, the circuit courts have frequently departed
from these traditional standards in antitrust cases, and current trends
have generated some confusion as to the applicable standards. Perhaps
in response to the critical commentary of those who favor an automatic
approach, '8 some courts have diluted the showing required of the gov-
ernment. The balancing test, developed primarily in the Second Cir-
cuit, sets an alternative standard for plaintiffs unable to show a
likelihood of success on the merits. 19 This test, requiring only that the
plaintiff demonstrate "serious and substantial questions," has found
favor in a majority of the circuits-at least at the district court level.2"
While the use of the "serious and substantial questions" test in private
16. See, e.g., FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); FTC v. PepsiCo,
Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973); FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977); United
States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. I11. 1968).
17. Such remedies include consolidation of the hearing on a preliminary injunction with trial
on the merits, hold-separate orders and divestiture. See note 159 infra and text accompanying
notes 156-61 infra.
18. See SULLIVAN § 215, at 671 ("courts ought to be disposed to enter orders maintaining the
status quo whenever the government offers by affidavits a colorable case that the merger tran-
scends legal standards and that adequate ultimate relief would be jeopardized by allowing con-
summation"); Note, "Preliminary Preliminary" Relief Against Antiompetiive Mergers, 82 YALE
L.J. 155, 170 (1972). Legislative enactments have also influenced courts to move toward an auto-
matic approach. See, e.g., FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,350, at
76,111 (N.D. Ili. 1978); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
("Indeed, Section 13(b) [of the Federal Trade Commission Act] itself... reflects continuing con-
gressional concern with the means of halting incipient violations of Clayton § 7 before they oc-
cur").
19. See text accompanying notes 59-113 infra.
20. Courts adopting the balancing approach: Second Circuit: e.g., Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp.
v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp.
746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Third
Circuit: e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v.
Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965). Fourth Circuit: Blackwelder Furniture Co. v.
Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977). Ffth Circuit: see Pearl Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Tex. 1972). Sixth Circuit: Brandeis Mach. & Supply Corp. v.
Barber-Green Co., 503 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1974); see Beaute Craft Supply Co. v. Revlon, 402 F.
Supp. 385 (E.D. Mich- 1975). Seventh Circuit: Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. Nummanna Labo-
ratories Corp., 215 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1954); FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
62,350 (N.D. I11. 1978); United States v. Parents Magazine Enterprises, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas.
70,437 (N.D. Ill. 1962). Eighth Circuit. Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 441 F. Supp. 349 (W.D.
Mo. 1977); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 247 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Mo. 1964), affid,
382 U.S. 12 (1965). Ninth Circuit- e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. I.T.T. Continental
Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975). Tenth Circuit: see Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref.
Co., 338 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1964).
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antitrust litigation dates back to the Harriman v. Northern Securities
Co. 21 case, it has recently assumed increasing importance in antimerger
suits initiated by the government.22 Further, the Fourth Circuit has
recently adopted a rule prohibiting consideration of private hardship
when weighing the equities.23 Any private losses defendant might suf-
fer as the result of a preliminary injunction issued under section 13(b)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act24 are deemed irrelevant. The
impact of this departure from equity's traditions is still uncertain: while
many courts have required strong showings of extreme private hard-
ship to outweigh the public interest in effective antitrust enforcement, 25
no other appellate court has absolutely refused to consider private in-
jury.26 In any event, confficts have developed between the classic stan-
dards for a preliminary injunction and those set out in recent case law,
and the federal courts are currently struggling to reconcile these differ-
ences.
Compounding the problems in the case law are the various statu-
tory bases of jurisdiction under which the courts may grant preliminary
relief. Section 15 of the Clayton Act authorizes the Justice Department
to seek injunctions; 27 section 16 authorizes the remedy for private
plaintiffs.2" Until 1974, the Expediting Act of 190329 further compli-
cated the jurisdictional scheme by providing that the Supreme Court-
and not the courts of appeals-had jurisdiction on direct review of dis-
trict court cases interpreting sections 15 and 16.30 Until 1966, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) was not permitted to seek preliminary
21. 132 F. 464 (C.C.NJ. 1904), rev'don the merits, 134 F. 331 (3d Cir. 1905).
22. No appellate court has yet adopted the lesser test in a government antimerger case. Re-
cent applications of the test in the Southern District of New York, see note 20 supra, raise the issue
whether the serious and substantial questions test should be applied in government actions. See
text accompanying notes 162-65 inra.
23. FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 547 F.2d
247 (4th Cir. 1977).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976).
25. See text accompanying notes 134-42 infra.
26. But see FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing
with approval FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976), vacatedas moot, 547
F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977)).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
28. Id. § 26.
29. Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823.
30. United States v. FMC Corp., 84 S. Ct. 4 (1963) (per Goldberg, J., in chambers) (not
officially reported). Direct appeal is now available only from final judgments in government anti-
trust suits seeking equitable relief where, on application of a party, the district court issues an
expediting order and the Supreme Court elects to hear the case rather than to remand to the court
of appeals. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1976). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
§ 105, at 527-28 (3d ed. 1976).
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injunctions from the courts;3' eventually the Supreme Court, in FTC v.
Dean Foods Co. ,32 found the necessary jurisdiction for the appellate
courts under the All Writs Act.33  Slightly different standards control
under each of these jurisdictional statutes.34 The most serious problem
of jurisdiction, however, involves an amendment to the Federal Trade
Commission Act, adding section 13(b), 5 which authorizes the FTC to
seek preliminary injunctions in the district courts to restrain violations
of any law that it enforces. 36  Distinctions between the language of
Clayton Act section 15 and that of Federal Trade Commission Act sec-
tion 13(b) apparently make section 13(b) a more favorable jurisdic-
tional ground for the government.37 There has been some doubt
whether traditional equity standards apply at all under that amend-
ment.38 These doubts and differences create further conflict among the
courts and lead to anomalous results in strikingly similar government
actions.39
31. See, e.g., FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956).
32. 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 165(a) (1970). The holding became obsolete when Congress enacted 15
U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976), giving the FTC specific statutory power to seek such injunctions.
34. Under Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), the private plaintiff must show immedi-
ate danger of irreparable harm, e.g., Triebwasser & Katz v. A.T. & T. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1359 (2d
Cir. 1976), whereas the language of Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976), eliminates that re-
quirement in government suits, e.g., United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061,
1074 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), af'dsub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971). The Dean
Foods holding under the All Writs Act, on the other hand, was interpreted to require that the
FTC show that "an effective remedial order, once the merger was implemented, would... be
virtually impossible" if the injunction were denied. FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 28-29 (2d
Cir. 1973).
35. See note 18 supra.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976) provides:
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe-
(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to
violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, and
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the
Commission and until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set aside
by the court on review, or until the order of the Commission made thereon has
become final, would be in the interest of the public-
the Commission. . . may bring suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin any
such act or practice. Upon aproper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the
Commission'r likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in thepublic interest..
a preliminary injunction may be granted without bond....
(Emphasis added.)
37. Section 13(b) has been held to preclude the weighing of private equities, although similar
provisions of the Clayton Act are subject to no such interpretation. See notes 120, 127, 132 infra
and text accompanying notes 114-32 infra. See Annot., 34 A.L.R. FED. 507 (1977).
38. Interpretation of a very similar provision, § 13(a), is discussed at 65 HARv. L. REv. 349
(1951).
39. Compare FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973) (injunction denied under All
Writs Act) with FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (injunction
254 [Vol. 1979:249
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II. THE NEW STATUTE'S IMPACT ON CURRENT LAW
The notification statute is intended to change only the procedural
aspects of antitrust litigation; it is not designed to alter substantive stan-
dards, nor to set up any hard and fast rules governing the propriety of
injunctive relief.' Thus, the statute does not address directly the sub-
stantive problems the courts are now facing. The premerger legislation
will, however, have some substantive impact on the government's abil-
ity to obtain a preliminary injunction in a particular case. On the mer-
its, the enforcement agencies' access to all relevant information weeks
prior to the merger will clearly aid in preparation for the showing of a
likelihood of success.4 The statute's legislative history, with its empha-
sis on the inadequacy of divestiture to protect the public interest in
effective antitrust enforcement,42 may influence the courts to favor the
government's case on the equities.4 3 The idea that divestiture is an un-
satisfactory remedy is hardly new,' but it was a recurrent theme
throughout the Senate hearings and the single most important motive
for the legislation.45 Under this analysis, the issuance of a preliminary
injunction would become virtually automatic, especially if the courts
granted under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)) and United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (injunction denied under 15 U.S.C. § 15).
40. HOUSE REPORT 8. The statute is also unlikely to stall the current merger wave. National
L.J., Oct. 30, 1978, at 6, col. 2.
41. See text accompanying notes 170-93 infra. Senate Hearings, pt. 1, 71 (statement of Lewis
Engman, Chairman, FTC) ("if we can get information to support our position, we can go to court
and obtain an order that ensures that there will be a divestible entity if we ultimately pre-
vail .... The... waiting period will permit us... to obtain information and to seek appropri-
ate relief'); id. 90, 96 (statement of Thomas Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division); SULLIVAN § 215, at 669 n.1 ("This act, passed as a compromise measure, would facili-
tate pre-merger investigation and greatly enhance the potential for preliminary relief').
42. See note 4 supra. Similar statements are found in Senate Hearings, pt. 1, 205 (statement
of Professor Walter Adams, Michigan State University) ("This ... provision ... would avoid
the practical difficulties of a postmerger unscrambling of already commingled assets, or of con-
vincing the courts to undertake this onerous task"); id., pt. II, at 535, 546 (statement of John
Flynn) ("the economic incentives of reaping the profits of the merger in the form of dividends and
capital gains make ultimate divestiture a long and tedious process"); id. 584 (letter from Con-
sumer Protection Board, Executive Department, State of New York). Additional problems are
involved in partial divestiture, the handling of improvements and locating a buyer who is not in
competition with the divested firm. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. &
EcON. 43, 53-74 (1969).
43. Cf. FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("The legislative
history of Section 13(b) reveals congressional concern with the FTC's historic inability to effectu-
ate a remedy once an acquisition is consummated .... [The provision] shows congressional rec-
ognition of the fact that divestiture is an inadequate and unsatisfactory remedy .. " The court
concluded that no evidentiary hearing or extensive analysis of the underlying antitrust issues was
necessary where a Clayton § 7 violation was alleged). See text accompanying notes 201-213 infra.
44. See Elzinga, supra note 42.
45. See notes 4 & 42 supra.
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continue their current trend toward liberalization of equity's standards.
In light of the legislative history, however, the courts must avoid
any radical departure from equity's traditions. The Senate did consider
including a provision for automatic relief in the legislation; the bill as
originally proposed would have given the enforcement agencies a pre-
liminary injunction solely on certification to the district court that the
public interest required such reliefpendente lite.46 Heavy opposition to
this provision came from almost every quarter. Both the Chairman of
the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney General for
the Antitrust Division rejected the proposal in Senate hearings, advis-
ing that such discretionary power would be unnecessarily broad.47 As-
sistant Attorney General Kauper's remarks were representative of the
agencies' attitude: "I suppose, like many bureaucrats, it is nice to have
power, but I am also a little suspicious of it, and I think that perhaps
that [automatic-stay provision] goes somewhat too far.' 48 The business
community vigorously opposed the automatic injunction, with one
business representative attacking the legislation as a denial of due proc-
ess.49 Even witnesses who supported the provision expressed concern
about possible chilling effects on lawful merger activity.50 If anything
emerges clearly from the Senate hearings on its Title V legislation,51 it
is the almost uniform criticism of the attempt to deprive the courts of
their discretion on merger injunctions. Congressional debate, showing
further hostility to such legislation, indicates that the proposal was
doomed from the outset. 2
Two considerations in addition to fear of bureaucratic overreach-
mng support the legislature's decision to omit any automatic-stay provi-
sion from the statute. The first is the value of tradition in federal
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has addressed the issue with elo-
quence:
We are dealing here with the requirements of equity practice with a
background of several hundred years of history .... Flexibility
rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and
practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well
46. S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 23(d) (1975), reprinted in Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 29-30.
47. Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 71, 82.
48. Id. 82.
49. Id. 195 (statements on S. 1284, Antitrust and FTC Act Amendments, for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States by J.W. Riehm and J. Randolph Wilson).
50. Id. 513 (statement of Professor Joseph F. Brodley).
51. The premerger notification requirements were set out in Title V of the Senate bill but
were included in Title II of the House bill. See note 5 supra.
52. 122 CONG. REc. S15,420 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1976) (remarks of Senator Percy).
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as between competing private claims."
Tradition is basic to the concept of equity and prevents conflict or con-
fusion among the lower courts. The second consideration, emphasized
throughout hearings on the notification statute, is the necessity for i-
quidity in the capital assets market. 4 To delay a merger is often to kill
the merger, and witnesses expressed doubt that entrepreneurial activity
could coexist with that degree of governmental control implicit in the
automatic stay." The legislature foresaw that such an amendment to
the antitrust laws could in fact harm competition by preventing merg-
ers that would be in the public interest. 6 Congress was unwilling to
give the FTC and the Justice Department the power to forestall any
merger they thought undesirable; the legislature left the decision to the
courts of equity in their traditional discretion.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN APPROACHES
In the legislative history of the notification statute, Congress ex-
pressed great concern for the broad policy issues involved in prelimi-
nary relief against challenged mergers but directed little if any
attention to recent developments in the federal courts. In the hearings
and debates, Congress ignored both the Second Circuit's balancing ap-
proach57 and the Fourth Circuit's refusal to consider private injury in
section 13(b) actions.5 These developments, however, are of great sig-
nificance in government antimerger suits, and it is therefore necessary
to examine the origin of these tests and their impact on federal equity-
particularly in light of the concerns expressed before the legislature in
formulating the Clayton Act amendments.
A. The Probability of Success.- The Second Circuit's Substantial
Questions Test.
Traditionally, the two requirements for issuance of a preliminary
injunction have been applied sequentially; that is, the courts have first
required proof of a reasonable probability of success at plenary hear-
ings and have then proceeded to weigh the equities. 9 The balancing
53. Hecht Co. v. Bowels, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).
54. Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 157 (statement of J. Randolph Wilson on behalf of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce); id. 513 (statement of Professor Joseph F. Brodley); id. 529-30 (statement
of Robert A. Longman, Chairman, Antitrust Section, New York State Bar Association); id., pt. II,
at 1033 (memorandum from the Securities Industry Association).
55. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
56. CONG. REC., supra note 52.
57. See text accompanying notes 59-113 infra.
58. See text accompanying notes 114-65 infra.
59. See Metzger & Friedlander, The Preliminary Injunction: Injury Without Remedy?, 29 Bus.
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approach, however, represents an exception to this rule: the equities are
weighed first, and where they balance decidedly in favor of the moving
party, the injunction will issue merely on a showing of serious and sub-
stantial questions on the merits.60 In other words, a strong showing on
the equities may offset a weak showing on the merits. The impact of
the balancing approach on federal equity practice has been substan-
tial-the exception may soon engulf the rule in antitrust cases.6 1
Despite broad acceptance of the balancing approach, the test, as it
is currently applied, is subject to three major criticisms. First, the mod-
em version of the approach is arguably a bastardization of equity's
traditional role in protecting and reconciling competing claims. 62 Sec-
ond, to the extent that the modem rule represents a departure from
tradition, it has led to confusion among the courts and to attempts to
retreat from its more liberal tests.63 Third, the true function of the ap-
proach in antitrust cases may be primarily to satisfy the courts' desire
to postpone consideration of complex substantive issues until full hear-
ing,64 a goal which is particularly inappropriate where issuance of the
injunction will probably mean the abandonment of merger plans. A
brief history and analysis of the case law serves to illustrate these weak-
nesses.
In order to measure the extent to which modem law has departed
from traditional equity practice, it is necessary to look back to the turn
of the century. The balancing approach originated in and was devel-
oped primarily by the Second Circuit, where its application in an-
timerger suits began with Harriman v. Northern Securities Co.61 In that
case, the old circuit court sitting in New Jersey granted preliminary
relief despite Harriman's failure to show a likelihood of success on the
LAW. 913, 915 (1974) ("The [four] rules of Virginia Petroleum [Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 291
(D.C. Cir. 1958)] have been viewed by the courts as sequential in concept as well as expression.
That is, a petitioner must first demonstrate a probability of ultimate success before the courts will
even consider the irreparable injury question" (footnotes omitted)).
60. The courts use various phrases to describe the requirement of probable success on the
merits, but there is little substantive difference between one wording and another. 11 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 13, at 451-52. Courts have long acknowledged, however, a substantive differ-
ence between requiring a probability of success and requiring only serious and substantial ques-
tions. See cases cited in note 66 infra and see accompanying text. For example, the holding in
Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975), apparently hinged on this very
distinction. Also see Chemetron Corp. v. Crane Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. % 61,717 (N.D. Ill. 1977),
where the court rejected the liberal balancing test. See Note, supra note 7, at 109-10.
61. See note 20 supra for a selective list of those courts adopting the balancing approach.
62. See note 74 infra and text accompanying notes 65-74 infra.
63. See notes 87 & 89 infra and text accompanying notes 84-90 infra.
64. See text accompanying notes 91-95 infra. See N.Y.U.L. Rv. Note at 776 (balancing
approach turns on complexity of issues raised rather than on strength of plaintiff's case).
65. 132 F. 464 (C.C.N.J. 1904), rey'd on the merits, 134 F. 331 (3d Cir. 1905).
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merits. The court cited a long line of cases, both American and Eng-
lish,6 6 in support of a rather narrow exception to the usual requirement
of a showing of probable success on the merits. Where the moving
party would suffer "immediate, certain and great"' 67 injury if the court
denied the injunction and where harm to the defendant would be "in-
considerable"6 if the court granted it, a preliminary injunction would
issue on a showing of only substantial questions on the merits.69 Only
an "enormous preponderance of inconvenience"7" to plaintiff would
warrant the exception. The court set out its rationale: "The balance of
convenience or hardship . . . is a factor of controlling importance in
cases of substantial doubt existing at the time of granting or refusing a
preliminary injunction."'" The narrow exception set out here seems
firmly within equity's traditions and is based on a strong and well-rea-
soned line of precedent.
The major departure from this statement of the rule appeared in
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co.,72 involving a Clayton Act
challenge brought by the target of an unfriendly takeover. In affirming
the district court's preliminary injunction, Judge Frank also placed par-
ticular emphasis on the balance of hardship:
To justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the plain-
tiff's right to a final decision, after a trial, be absolutely certain... ;
if the other elements are present (ie., the balance of hardships tips
decidedly toward plaintiff), it will ordinarily be enough that the
plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substan-
tial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litiga-
tion and thus for more deliberate investigation.
73
Frank's language--"tips decidedly toward plaintiff"-is a markedly
liberal version of the standard set out in Northern Securities. The par-
enthetical language of Hamilton Watch may be merely a casual restate-
ment of precedent; the court did not ultimately decide the case on the
issue of probability of success. The federal courts, nonetheless, have
adopted the Hamilton Watch wording, and the narrow exception to the
probability of success requirement has consequently become signifi-
66. Among the cases cited were Allison v. Corson, 88 F. 851 (8th Cir. 1898); City of Newton
v. Levis, 79 F. 715 (8th Cir. 1897); Shrewsbury & Chester v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham Ry.,
[1851] 1 Sim. (n.s.) 410, reprintedin 61 Eng. Rep. 159 (V.C. 1851).
67. 132 F. at 485 (quoting Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. United States, 124 F. 156, 161 (8th
Cir. 1903)).
68. 132 F. at 476 (quoting City of Newton v. Levis, 79 F. 715, 718 (8th Cir. 1897)).
69. 132 F. at 485.
70. Id. at 478 (quoting Shrewsbury & Chester v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham Ry., [1851] 1
Sim. (n.s.) 410, 434, reprinted in 61 Eng. Rep. 159, 168 (V.C. 1851)).
71. 132 F. at 476.
72. 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).




Frank's unorthodox statement of the rule did not meet with imme-
diate acceptance throughout the federal courts. The district court in
United States v. Brown Shoe Co. ,7 one of the first government cases to
consider Hamilton Watch, acknowledged the Eighth Circuit's line of
holdings similar to that in Northern Securities76 but rejected Frank's
language. The court distinguished Hamilton Watch on the ground that
the Brown Shoe case was "not the 'ordinary case' where proof to sup-
port issuance of the writ in the 'ordinary' case should apply."77 This
distinction may seem somewhat superficial, but the reasons for the
court's hesitation are clear:
Taken literally, the requirements for issuance of a preliminary writ
are very meager. We are reluctant to believe the Government would
institute proceedings that did not present at least a "fair ground for
litigation" and "deliberate investigation" by the Court, because is-
sues are "serious, substantial and doubtful." Few Clayton Act cases
are simple. Seldom is the Court without doubt in its decision even
though it does not say so. The Hamilton Watch case does not hold
that the quantum of proof indicated shall apply in all cases-"it will
ordinarily be enough."78
The Hamilton Watch rule, while supported by precedent, clearly went
beyond the traditional exception, and the court in Brown Shoe was un-
willing to accept the liberal standard.
More recently, the rule of Hamilton Watch has become firmly en-
trenched in the Second Circuit. The rule reached its maturity in
74. The Hamilton Watch decision did not address the showing necessary to tip the balance
decidedly in favor of the moving party, but it is clear that the government is not required to make
the traditional showing of an "enormous preponderance of inconvenience." As the court stated in
Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,261 at 75,631 (W.D. Mo. 1977),
the Northern Securities test has "been variously expressed, and, recently, [has] been applied in
such a manner as to minimize the importance of the movants showing a likelihood of success on
the merits." Id. at 356. In fact, the courts have sometimes allowed the substantial questions test
and shifted the burden on the equities to the defendant. E.g., United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252
F. Supp. 962, 986 (W.D. Pa. 1965). See FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
62,350, at 76,113 (N.D. IIL. 1978); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). Since the Hamilton Watch standard requires no examination of the strength of plaintiffs
case, the Pennzoil approach requires onl that the government present complex issues-a very
meager requirement in antitrust cases. See N.Y.U.L. REv. Note 776 (citing United States v. Alu-
minum Corp. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 271 (1964), as a case
in which the liberal Hamilton Watch rule led to a questionable decision).
75. 1956 Trade Cas. 1 68,244, at 71,109 (E.D. Mo. 1956). Although never officially reported,
Judge Hulen's memorandum opinion is reprinted in part in further proceedings growing out of the
same merger. 179 F. Supp. 721, 724 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 1959), a f'd, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
76. 1956 Trade Cas. at 71,114.
77. Id. at 71,116.
78. Id. at 71,115 (emphasis in original). The Eighth Circuit later adopted Hamilton Watch in
a government suit. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 247 F. Supp. 308, 314 (E.D. Mo.
1964), aj'd, 382 U.S. 12 (1965).
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Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington 4ssociates.79 Sonesta
involved another attempt to forestall a hostile takeover, this time on the
ground of alleged violation of securities regulations. The Second Cir-
cuit harmonized traditional equity standards with the Hamilton Watch
approach to arrive at a two-pronged test:
[A] preliminary injunction should issue only upon a clear showing of
either (1) probable success on the merits and possible irreparable in-
jury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make
them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipg
decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.8 -
After Sonesta, the language of Hamilton Watch clearly controls in the
Second Circuit; the objection that the liberal wording-Frank's 'casual
restatement'-distorts the traditional rule is no longer of much force.
Indeed, Sonesta is now cited as a matter of course in private antitrust
litigation.8" Though use of the Hamilton-Sonesta approach in govern-
ment antimerger cases was delayed82 in the Second Circuit until re-
cently, the disposition of FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp. 83 substantially
reduced any doubt concerning its applicability. The court for the
Southern District of New York summarily held that the FTC had met
its burden of proof in that case merely through a showing of serious
and substantial questions.
Adoption of the Hamilton-Sonesta approach in government suits,
however, has not been free of problems. United States v. Culbro
Corp. ,84 an antimerger case decided shortly after Lancaster, illustrates
the confusion that may arise in an attempt to retreat from the Sonesta
standards. Judge Ward revived the irreparable harm requirement,
holding that if the government was unable to demonstrate a reasonable
probability of success, the court could not presume irreparable harm
from the statutory ban on anticompetitive mergers.8 5 This approach
79. 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
80. Id. at 250 (emphasis in original).
81. E.g., Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., No. 79-7093 (2d Cir. Aug. 1,
1979); Jacobson & Co. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 548 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1977); Triebwasser & Katz
v. A.T.&T. Co., 535 F.2d 1356 (2d Cir. 1976); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498
F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); In FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1973), the court never mentioned contemporary developments in the Hamilton Watch line and
instead followed a more traditional line of government antitrust cases holding the FTC to a stan-
dard of a reasonable probability of success. PepsiCo read the Supreme Court's Dean Foods deci-
sion very narrowly and placed a heavy burden on the government. See notes 33 & 34 supra and
text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
82. See FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973), where the court used the reasonable
probability standard without ever mentioning contemporary developments in the Hamilton Watch
test.
83. 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
84. 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
85. Id. at 750.
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may represent a circuitous return to the reasonable probability stan-
dard; the government must show a likelihood of success whenever pub-
lic injury is not amenable to direct proof-and it rarely is. Judge Ward
went on to hold that even after a showing by plaintiff of a probability
of success, the court must still weigh the equities, requiring in addition
that the Justice Department show reasonable probability of harm to the
public prior to full trial. 6 Again, the court refused to presume harm
from the statute. Ward's opinion clearly represents a cautious ap-
proach to the preliminary injunction, an attempt to retreat from the
liberal Sonesta rule.
The doubt and confusion caused by the Sonesta line is even more
apparent in the Third Circuit. A strong line of cases following United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 7 has established that the reasonable
probability test prevails in that circuit,8 8 but district court cases have
subjected this standard to substantial erosion. In fact, the history of the
controlling Ingersoll-Rand decision illustrates the conflict between ap-
pellate and district court opinion. The court of appeals, in affirming
the district court's holding, clearly used the reasonable probability stan-
dard without mentioning that the lower court in that case had applied
the substantial questions test.89 A district court case decided two years
later preferred the substantial questions standard and sustained the
Justice Department's attack on a merger.90
A recent private case from the Third Circuit frankly admits that
the court turned to the substantial questions test because it provides a
method of postponing difficult substantive decisions until full hearing.
In Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal,91 the court acknowledged that the rea-
sonable probability test prevails in the Third Circuit, but reasoned that
"should the Circuit have occasion to rule on the matter in the context
of a case such as the one before us, it would embrace the less stringent
criterion." 92 Judge Miller's colorful opinion relied on Delaware River
86. Id.
87. 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). It is interesting to note that although this case is still control-
ling in the Third Circuit, Mr. Justice Goldberg's in chambers opinion in United States v. FMC
Corp., 84 S. Ct. 4 (1963), raises serious doubts about the jurisdictional grounds on which it rests.
88. Eg., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White ConsoL Indus. Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.C.N.J.
1964).
89. Compare 320 F.2d at 525 (requiring "the probability of a lessening of competition and
...reasonable probability of success on final hearing") with 218 F. Supp. 530, 544 (W.D. Pa.
1963) ("The ultimate legal issues involved in this action raise such serious and substantial ques-
tions. . . as to require that consummation be, at least, postponed until final hearing").
90. United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 986 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
91. 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
92. Id. at 587; see Vanadium Corp. v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686, 697 (1962).
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Port Authority v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc.,9' in which the
Third Circuit held that a district court may, in its discretion, grant an
injunction "even though plaintiffs did not demonstrate as strong a like-
lihood of ultimate success as would generally be required. 94 Miller
concluded that the novelty and complexity of the suit made determina-
tion of likelihood of success impractical in a preliminary proceeding.95
Merger cases, however, are invariably complex and frequently novel as
well, and the substantial questions test will always offer an attractive
alternative to sorting out a reasonable probability of success. This ap-
proach is clearly unsatisfactory, however, where the effect of a prelimi-
nary injunction is abandonment of merger plans.
Clearly, the balancing test has certain weaknesses, but the alterna-
tive sequential approach, requiring a reasonable probability of success,
is equally vulnerable. The Clayton Act is an "incipiency" statute,
designed to outlaw mergers that are reasonably likely to have anticom-
petitive effects.96 Thus, the test for a preliminary injunction should re-
quire a showing of a reasonable probability that the merger is
reasonably likely to harm competition. Rather than attempting such an
awkward approach, however, the courts have sometimes chosen to
abridge the test, demanding merely a showing of a reasonable likeli-
hood of anticompetitive impact.97 This showing is substantially identi-
cal to that required at ultimate hearing and may be too stiff a
requirement for preliminary relief.98 The parties are simply unpre-
pared to present a full-blown antitrust analysis in a preliminary pro-
ceeding, and the courts are understandably hesitant to arrive at a
decision on the likelihood of success with only a tentative analysis of
fact and law.99 Thus, although the substantial questions test presents
93. 501 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1974).
94. Id. at 923. In fact, the Delaware River decision may come to supersede the Ingersoll-
Rand case as the controlling precedent. See Constructors Ass'n of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811
(3d Cir. 1978); Obury v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975).
95. 403 F. Supp. at 587.
96. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962).
97. E.g., United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 525 (3d Cir. 1963) (requiring a
showing of a probable lessening of competition).
98. See HousE REPORT 7-8 ("Focused as it is on probabilities, this standard for injunctive
relief is little different from the steep one forced by [sic] the government at a trial on the merits
. . ."); Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 503 (statement of Professor Joseph F. Brodley) ("the Government
has been put to the same standard of proof on the motion for preliminary injunction which it must
face at the ultimate trial"); id., pt. II, at 1002 (letter from Thomas Kauper, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, to Senator Hart) ("In practice, it has frequently been necessary to
convince the trial court of the ultimate merits of the case").
99. Id., pt. I, 505 (statement of Professor Joseph F. Brodley) ("[The government] is unpre-
pared on an early record to make that kind of showing .... The case is simply not ripe"). See
FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 1977) ("it is difficult, if not impossible,
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problems in equity jurisprudence and practice, the alternative, the rea-
sonable probability test, provides no easy answers.
The district courts are therefore caught in a dilemma when choos-
ing between the sequential and balancing approaches: the reasonable
probability test is too complex and awkward to be practical at a prelim-
inary hearing; the substantial questions test is too cursory and superfi-
cial to be appropriate where the decision may have the effect of final
relief. It is hardly surprising that courts faced with this dilemma have
adopted an intuitive approach to the problem, choosing between the
tests as necessary to preserve the status quo or the possibility of an
adequate remedy after final decision. °0 What may be surprising is that
the pattern currently emerging is on6 of broad acceptance of the bal-
ancing approach in private antimerger litigation and adherence to the
reasonable probability test in government suits.
The various weaknesses in the balancing approach are primarily
the result of this government plaintiff-private plaintiff dichotomy. The
Sonesta line developed exclusively in the context of private actions,
and it was the application of this approach to government suits that led
to rejection of the test in Brown Shoe"1 and confusion of the test in
Culbro.t°2 While the Fourth,10 3 Sixth," and Ninth 0 5 Circuits have
to determine the FTC's chances of ultimate success when the law is so uncertain and the parame-
ters of the [potential entrant] doctrine obscure"); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp.
1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no extensive analysis of antitrust issues necessary in preliminary proceed-
ing under Clayton § 7); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 587 n.13 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(case "rife with factual and legal complexities" that are not "readily amenable to preliminary
adjudication"); Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988
(D.D.C.), aft'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (novel legal issues involved in antitrust action pre-
cluded issuance of preliminary injunction).
100. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
101. 1956 Trade Cas. 168,244 (E.D. Mo. 1956). See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
102. 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra and notes
163-65 infra.
103. See text accompanying notes 106-08 infra.
104. Compare Brandeis Mach. & Supply Corp. v. Barber-Greene Co., 503 F.2d 503, 505 (6th
Cir. 1974) (employing the Hamilton Watch standard) and Beaute Craft Supply Co. v. Revlon Inc.,
402 F. Supp. 385, 388-89 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (relaxing standard on merits in antitrust case) with
United States v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1397, 1400 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (using
probability of success requirement).
105. Compare William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d
86, 88 (9th Cir. 1975) (adopting "alternative test" of the Second Circuit) with United States v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 575 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing with approval lower court's use
of substantial likelihood test) andUnited States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 823 (N.D. Cal.),
appeal dismissed, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), applicationforpreliminary injunction denied, 84 S. Ct. 4
(1963) (per Goldberg, J. in chambers) ("clear probability" of success necessary). But see United
States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REp. 162,445 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (allowing for possibil-
ity of using Sonesta in government suit where government shows "decided tipping of the equi-
ties").
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followed Hamilton, the substantial questions test has yet to be applied
in a government suit in any of those jurisdictions. The Fourth Circuit's
decisions are particularly apposite here, in view of the fact that a 1977
appellate decision liberalizing the standard for a private plaintiff
10 6
came only one month after another appellate decision requiring a strict
standard of proof and a showing of probability of success from the
FTC. 7 In addition, a Fourth Circuit ruling only six months earlier
held that the FTC met its burden of a "substantial likelihood of suc-
cess."' 0 8 Although no court has specifically addressed this distinction
between government and private suits or attempted to explain it, it
clearly exists.
Commentary attempting to justify the distinction between govern-
ment and private cases is not entirely convincing. 10 9 The theory is that
the government, in contrast to the private plaintiff, is unlikely to aban-
don its suit after failing to obtain a preliminary injunction. The gov-
ernment's resources are not as limited as those of a private plaintiff,
and while the government has the alternative of divestiture, that rem-
edy may be unavailable to the private plaintiff. The denial of a prelim-
inary injunction is more likely to have the effect of final relief in a
private action, thus making the more liberal substantial questions test
appropriate. 110 This argument seems rather weak, however, because
the government's resources are actually quite limited.' Furthermore,
if divestiture is an inadequate remedy, its availability in government
suits should make little difference in terms of the applicable test.
There is a more compelling reason for rejection of Sonesta in gov-
ernment suits. Many of the difficulties with the balancing approach
may be traced to the origin and development of the Sonesta line of
cases; that standard evolved solely in private antitrust actions where the
irreparable injury and balance of hardship requirements are of great
importance, and it is far less appropriate in government suits where
presumptions of injury often control. The substantial questions test is
now triggered by a "decided imbalance" of the equities, but the
Sonesta approach gives courts little guidance as to the relative weights
106. Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).
107. FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977).
108. FTC v. Food Town Stores, 539 F.2d 1339, 1344 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 547 F.2d
247 (4th Cir. 1977).
109. N.Y.U.L. Rav. Note at 776-77.
110. Id. 776-77.
111. See Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 137 (statement of Ralph Nader and Mark Greene, Corpo-
rate Accountability Research Group) ("for too long antitrust enforcement has been an ant eyeing
an elephant-an under-funded and handicapped Federal program unable to contend with the
great corporate power of our dominant firms").
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of the required showings even in private suits. The point at which the
equities "tip decidedly" is necessarily less clear in government suits
where a somewhat nebulous public injury must be balanced against
concrete and measurable private hardship.1 2 Because damage to the
public interest is not amenable to direct proof, courts often presume
such injury from the existence of a statute, particularly a statute which
specifically authorizes a preliminary injunction." 3 The utility of
Sonesta is extremely doubtful in government cases: it is all but impossi-
ble to determine when the balance tips decidedly in favor of a public
injury which is merely presumed as opposed to a private harm which is
clearly identifiable.
Thus, modem trends to reduce the required showing on the merits
are coming into conflict with developments on the requisite showing on
the equities. In order to understand this conflict more fully, it is neces-
sary to examine the recent developments on the equities, particularly
the Fourth Circuit's refusal to consider any private injury in weighing
the equities.
B. The Balance of the Equities. The Fourth Circuit Excludes
Consideration of the Respondent~' Injury.
The Fourth Circuit has initiated what is obviously the most liberal
development in the required showing on the equities. The holding in
FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc. 14 marks a radical departure from the
orthodox rules of equity; the court held that in section 13(b) proceed-
ings private injuries that respondents might suffer as a result of the in-
junction did not even merit consideration." 5 Judge Winter, sitting as
the single judge, refused to weigh a number of contingencies, among
them the possibility of a lawsuit by a creditor or by stockholders, the
necessity of amending the SEC registration statement, a possible de-
cline in the value of Foodtown's stock and the ultimate abandonment
of the merger. 1 6 Winter ruled that these and other serious hardships
112. See Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,393, at
76,378 (N.D.N.Y. 1978), aI'd, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978) ("The injury
which... the Government might suffer if a preliminary injunction is denied is remote and specu-
lative in nature. On the other hand, the injury which United and the Carrier shareholders would
suffer if a preliminary injunction were granted is real and immediate"); Senate Hearings, pt. I, at
294 (statement of Milton Handler) ("I am asking you, in turn, to give me a concrete case where an
antitrust violation has affected the general economy of the State in such a way as to be capable of
monetary measurement .... [W]ith all respect to the learned Senator from the State of Michigan,
I defy you to give me such a state of facts"). See cases cited note 147 infra.
113. See text accompanying note 15 su.pra.
114. 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 547 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977).
115. Id. at 1346.




the private injury which may result from an injunction delaying the
merger. I do not minimize them, but I conclude that they are...
not proper considerations for granting or withholding injunctive re-
lief under § 13(b). My conclusion in this respect is reinforced by rec-
ognition that many of them would result if any merger is enjoined on
the eve of its consummation; yet Congress enacted § 13(b) authoriz-
ing injunctive relief, thereby indicating that it thought that little
weight should be given to them.1
17
Winter did consider possible public benefits flowing from the acquisi-
tion, but characterized them as too speculative to outweigh the public
injury involved in an anticompetitive merger.1 18 In sum, Food Town
apparently established an almost irrebutable presumption in favor of
the government on the equities.
The language of section 13(b) is open to Winter's interpretation.
The statute gives the district courts power to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion where, "weighing the equities and considering the Commission's
likelihood of success, such action would be in the public interest."11 9
Judge Winter read the statute as if the requirement of balancing the
equities was centered on the public interest standard. Thus, the em-
phasis of section 13(b)'s language-ambiguous as it may be-led Win-
ter to infer that Congress was referring only to "public equities."
Under this interpretation, a corporation may introduce evidence of
public benefit deriving from a merger 120 but cannot rely on the injunc-
tion's direct impact on the firms involved.
The statute's language seems inadequate to justify Winter's sharp
break with longstanding principles of equity, and the Food Town rule is
therefore subject to serious criticism. The holding, however, is based
largely on the legislative history of section 13(b). Winter cited the
House Committee Report to demonstrate the intent "to maintain the
statutory or 'public interest' standard which is now applicable and not
to impose the traditional 'equity' standard." ' The report went on to
comment that the traditional tests are not "appropriate for the imple-
mentation of a Federal statute where the standards of the public inter-
117. Id. at 1346 (emphasis in original).
118. Id. (lower retail food prices are in public interest but are suspect as possibly predatory).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976). See note 36 supra for complete text.
120. Because public benefits-like public injury--are not amenable to direct proof, and be-
cause presumptions run in favor of the government, it is difficult to see how the defendant could
ever prevail under the Food Town approach.
121. 539 F.2d at 1343 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 624, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1973), reprinted in
[1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2523, 2533) (both authorities incorrectly citing H.R. REP.
No. 624 as 924).
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est measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief." 122 Winter
pointed out that this language was intended to codify decisional law in
cases 123 interpreting section 13(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 124 an injunction statute substantially similar to section 13(b) but
applicable only to advertising. While there is some indication in the
case law that weighing of private harm is unnecessary under section
13(a),125 the better-reasoned majority view is that of FTC v. National
Health Aids, Inc. :126 "The reasonable belief of the Commission is suffi-
cient to warrant its application for the injunction, but the action of the
Court should be based on the general considerations that properly ap-
ply in the issuance of preliminary injunctions."' 2 7 Thus, Winter's view
of the statute is not without support, but that support is undercut by
majority opinion and well-reasoned commentary. 128  The statute
clearly is designed merely to eliminate the requirement of irreparable
harm, and not to foreclose consideration of private injury.
Further development of the Food Town rule may be strictly lim-
ited. Only one district court, the Lancaster court in the Second Circuit,
has explicitly followed Winter's refusal to consider private hardship. 129
The Fourth Circuit itself may have signalled a retreat: in FTC v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co. ,131 the panel reworded the standards to allow weighing
of public and private injury. '31 Atlantic Richfield is distinguishable
from Food Town on jurisdictional grounds,' 3 2 but the case does evi-
dence a reluctance to follow the unorthodox Food Town holding.
122. Id.
123. See FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963); FTC v. National Health
Aids, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1952).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1976).
125. E.g,., FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951) (rational basis for
FTC's challenge held sufficient to justify preliminary injunction).
126. 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1952).
127. Id. at 346. Furthermore, § 13(b) includes the language "weighing the equities and con-
sidering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success," 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976), which directs
the court toward the traditional equitable standards. Section 13(a) omits this language. Thus,
there is more reason to use traditional standards under § 13(b) than under § 13(a). See FTC v.
National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919
(1976). Butsee FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 162,350, at 76,112-13 (N.D.
Ill. 1978) ("To achieve its goal of facilitating successful governmental intervention before [con-
summation of a merger], Congress has rendered the traditional equity requirements inapplicable
in a section 13(b) suit").
128. E.g., 65 HARV. L. Rav. 349 (1951). See Annot., supra note 37.
129. FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see FTC v.
Rhinechem Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,350 (N.D. In. 1978).
130. 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977).
131. Id. at 292.
132. Atlantic 'Richfeld was decided under 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976); Food Town was decided
under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976). The language of the two statutes is substantially different. See
notes 34 & 36 supra.
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Many courts, however, have adopted a line of reasoning similar to
that in Food Town. Some courts, while avoiding an absolute refusal to
consider private harm, have held that the public interest in effective
antitrust enforcement is entitled to great weight and that private hard-
ship must be extreme before the balance can be tipped in respondent's
favor. In United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,' the district court
held that the defendants' possible injuries were "entitled to serious con-
sideration" but concluded that "they cannot outweigh the public inter-
est in preventing this merger from taking effect pending trial .... The
public interest with which Congress was concerned in enacting Section
7 is paramount."' 34 A Third Circuit district court has held that "the
public interest in preserving a free-competitive [sic] economy cannot be
outweighed by any private interest."'' 35 Courts seem almost hostile at
times to corporate interests: "The public interest in preventing a viola-
tion of Sec. 7 outweighs considerations of losses to speculating or in-
vesting stockholders . . 136 In general, these courts have given little
weight to corporate injury; the public interest will prevail except in ex-
traordinary circumstances.
Other courts have taken a less dogmatic approach and have at-
tempted to reach a compromise between the important public interest
in preventing antitrust violations and the serious private harm often
caused by a preliminary injunction. The district court in United States
v. Pennzoil Co. '17 attempted to find a compromise on the equities stan-
dard: "[The showing of defendants' injury] must be so proportionately
persuasive as to submerge the principle that '[t]he status of public inter-
est and not the requirements of private litigation measure the propriety
and need for relief.' "s138 More frequently, the courts have used a com-
promise remedy, allowing the merger to go through but issuing a hold-
separate order to keep the assets and securities of the acquired firm
intact.1 39 The Second Circuit in FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 140 issuing a
hold-separate order, went so far as to allow consideration of the intent
133. 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aF'dsub no=. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986
(1971).
134. 297 F. Supp. at 1073-74; see id. at 1074 n.21 ("The failure of Congress to require that the
Government show irreparable loss... in a Section 7 action. . . indicates the Congressional
desire to lighten the burden generally imposed on an applicant for preliminary injunctive relief").
135. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 543 (W.D. Pa.), a f'd, 320 F.2d 509
(3d Cir. 1963).
136. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 657 (D.N.J. 1964).
137. 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
138. Id. at 986.
139. See note 159 infra and text accompanying notes 156-59 infra.
140. 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973).
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of the acquiring firm in determining the balance of hardships.1 4'
Courts in the Second and Eighth Circuits have also used the compro-
mise remedy to avoid inequity. 142 The prevailing atmosphere in these
courts is a sort of "strict scrutiny" in antitrust cases, with a heightened
sensitivity to the strong public interest.
Many of the courts' problems on the equities arise in attempting to
assess the extent of the public injury involved in any given case. It is all
but impossible to place a definite value on intangible injury to local or
national competition.' 43 There are two approaches to this problem: a
court may emphasize the public interest in preventing violations of an-
titrust laws, relying generally on the antitrust statutes as expressions of
public policy;'" alternatively, a court may stress foreseeable and par-
ticular components of injury to consumers, competitors or, in the case
of hostile tender offers, the acquired entities.' 45 The results of these
two approaches are often disparate: emphasis on the public's interest in
statutory enforcement usually precludes a balance in favor of the
merger,146 while more detailed analysis of public and private injury
gives defendants an opportunity to show tangible harm and the govern-
ment evidentiary problems. 47 Food Town and similar cases illustrate
that the first approach is increasingly becoming the rule; there is a very
strong presumption that the equities weigh in the government's favor.
The presumptions are buttressed by the courts' abandonment of
another traditional rule, that a preliminary injunction will not issue
where the result is to give petitioner the effect of final relief.1 48 Nor-
mally, equity seeks to maintain the status quo with a preliminary in-
junction. In the context of mergers and acquisitions, however,
preserving the status quo is often impossible, as the deal, if enjoined,
cannot be held together pending final judgment, and the merger, if al-
lowed, will irrevocably alter the competitive situation. 14 9 One com-
141. Id. at 27.
142. United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Brown
Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 68,244 (E.D. Mo. 1956).
143. See note 112 supra.
144. Eg., FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 547
F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977).
145. Eg., FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973).
146. Eg., FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
147. E.g., United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,445, at 76,627
(C.D. Cal. 1979) ("plaintiff (and the public) will sustain no injury at all if [injunctive relief] is
denied"); United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
148. Eg., Triebwasser & Katz v. A.T.&T. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1360 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969). See Schneiderman, supra note
7, at 589-97; Developments in Law, supra note 15, at 1058; N.Y.U.L. REv. Note 779.
149. Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 529 (statement of Robert A. Longman, Chairman, Antitrust
Section, New York State Bar Association); id. 513 (statement of Professor Joseph F. Brodley)
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mentator has argued that the courts appear to be sensitive to this
problem and are unwilling to issue an injunction where its effect would
be to kill the merger."' 0 One has only to look to cases such as Food
Town and Lancaster, however, to realize that courts no longer find per-
suasive respondents' fears that the injunction will have the effect of
final relief.
In rejecting this traditional rule of equity, the courts are often in-
fluenced by the inadequacy of divestiture after litigation as a remedy.
In the early 1960s, divestiture may have been considered the usual rem-
edy in merger cases; but as the courts became aware of Congress' con-
tinuing dissatisfaction with the results of divestiture, they turned to the
preliminary injunction as a more effective tool for antitrust enforce-
ment.15 1 The preliminary injunction seemed the most appropriate rem-
edy to prevent anticompetitive effects in their incipiency, before the
monopolistic effect grew to Sherman Act proportions.15 2 Increasing
congressional discontent with divestiturels3 as indicated by the
amendment of the Federal Trade Commission Act to facilitate injunc-
tive relief' 54 -led the courts to reject respondents' claims that the in-
junction had the effect of final judgment.15 5 Defendants' ability to tip
the balance of the equities was correspondingly reduced.
The availability of alternatives to divestiture is likely to be of some
assistance to corporate defendants on the equities. Theoretically, the
compromise hold-separate order keeps open the possibility of divesti-
ture even after years of litigation.'56 Authoritative commentary, how-
ever, has criticized the hold-separate order on the ground that it is
scarcely more effective than divestiture alone.'5 7 A recent landmark
("two writers with practical experience, one an enforcement official of the Department of Justice,
have suggested that merging partners have usually abandoned their proposed merger when the
government has obtained a preliminary injunction"); id., pt. II, at 1034 (memorandum from the
Securities Industry Association); N.Y.U.L. REv. Note 771-72. See notes 11 & 12 supra.
150. N.Y.U.L. REv. Note 775.
151. See FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339, 1343 (4th Cir. 1976), vacatedas moot,
547 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977); FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,350 (N.D.
Ill. 1978); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), af'd sub nom. Bartlett v. United
States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971) (interpreting the legislative history of Clayton Act § 15 to require
liberal standards).
152. E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962).
153. See notes 4, 42-43 supra.
154. See notes 36-37 supra.
155. See cases cited in note 151 supra.
156. See FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Culbro Corp., 436
F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 68,244 (E.D.
Mo. 1956). But see United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 567 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
157. SULLIVAN § 215, at 670; Note, supra note 18, at 165.
Vol. 1979:249]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [V, 17
case has held that rescission may be used to remedy an anticompetitive
merger.'58 The availability of rescission, which would eliminate some
of the problems of divestiture, 5 9 might encourage the use of hold-sepa-
rate orders with an eye toward rescission rather than divestiture. A
more attractive approach would be the consolidation of hearings on the
preliminary injunction with full trial, as authorized by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.160 In cases where trial can be expedited, 61
this approach avoids not only the hardships worked by prolonged pre-
liminary relief but also the problems of divestiture. The consolidation
of hearings, as well as the use of rescission, will not be practical or
appropriate in every case, but the availability of relief less drastic than
the preliminary injunction provides some counterweight to modem
presumptions that the equities are in the government's favor.
Despite recent use of alternatives to divestiture, presumptions in
the government's favor are still quite strong, and these presumptions,
coupled with limitations on defendants' showing on the equities, make
Sonesta's balancing test extremely difficult to apply in government
suits. Because the government's case usually relies heavily on the
strength of the public interest in effective enforcement, 62 it is all but
impossible to determine when the substantial questions standard
should be triggered. An even more forceful argument against the use
of Sonesta in government suits is that public injury can be presumed
only when the government has shown a reasonable probability of suc-
cess on the merits. The presumption of harm is derived from the
threatened violation of the Clayton Act, but if the government fails to
show a likelihood of success, there is no real reason to suspect that the
law will be broken or to presume injury to competition. Thus, the bal-
ancing approach is at odds with modem treatment of the equities: when
the government relies on the serious and substantial questions test, the
courts should also require a showing of a serious threat of public in-
jury-a requirement which Congress and the courts have eliminated.
The federal courts have not dealt with this issue explicitly, but at
least one holding, the Culbro decision by Judge Ward, appears to have
158. United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 575 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978).
159. Rescission would eliminate the problem of finding a buyer whose acquisition would not
have any anticompetitive effect. See Elzinga, supra note 42, at 61-66.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
161. Eg., United States v. Consol. Foods Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,110 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(not fundamentally unfair to force government to have its case ready within 133 days of filing
complaint where government waited four and a half months after announcement of merger to file
complaint and had familiarity with industry from previous litigation).
162. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
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intuitively sensed the problem.163 In applying the substantial questions
test, Ward eliminated the presumption of irreparable harm and re-
quired a showing of probability of actual public injury.164 Thus, the
Culbro case attempted to square the Sonesta test with modem treat-
ment of the equities in government cases. The attempt may not have
been conceptually satisfying, especially when Congress had eliminated
the irreparable harm requirement,1 65 yet such a move was necessary to
reconcile incompatible developments in the law.
C. Summary. Standards for a Preliminary Injunction.
The law of the preliminary injunction remains in a state of flux,
with the greatest uncertainty in the showings required in a government
action. If the spread of the Sonesta approach throughout the circuits is
an accurate indicator, that test may become standard even in govern-
ment suits. Furthermore, the next step in the development of the
Sonesta line must be the elimination of the decided imbalance of the
equities as the trigger for the substantial questions test. This change
may be effected in two ways: first, by giving the government an ir-
rebutable presumption that the balance tips decidedly in its favor and
so allows the lesser burden of Sonesta;166 and second, by resorting to
Sonesta's substantial questions test merely to postpone consideration of
complex substantive issues regardless of the equities. 167 Contemporary
developments in the treatment of the equities may limit further liberali-
zation of the requirements on the merits; the courts may be beginning
to realize that presumptions of harm make Sonesta inappropriate in
government suits.1 68 The availability of rescission and consolidation of
163. United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
164. Id. at 750.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976); see United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061,
1074 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a f'dsub non Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971).
166. See FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In FTC v.
Rhinechem Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,350, at 76,108 (N.D. Ill. 1978), the court fol-
lowed the Lancaster approach and took the view that the serious and substantial questions test is
to be applied in section 13(b) proceedings regardless of the equities: "Although this record might
not support injunctive relief under the traditional equiptable [sic] standard, which demands ... a
'reasonable likelihood of success on the merits' . . . it is deemed sufficient to merit the relief
requested under section 13(b)." Id. at 76,111. The court went on to hold that a showing of serious
and substantial questions is adequate to raise a strong presumption of harm in the government's
favor. Id. at 76,113. The court based its departure from the traditional standards of equity on the
legislative history of section 13(b). See text accompanying notes 114-28 supra.
167. See Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Under the Sonesta
standard, the complexity of the problems raised may be more important than the strength of the
plaintiff's case. If the test is improperly applied, without regard to the equities, then the Sonesta
approach may give the plaintiff the effect of final relief without any showing that Clayton § 7 has
been violated or any showing of interim harm.
168. See United States v. Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See text accompa-
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hearings will weigh against use of the drastic preliminary injunction.
These last conclusions, however, may be premature: the Lancaster de-
cision did combine the substantial questions test with a refusal to con-
sider any private harm. 16 9 Under this approach, the traditional
standards of equity are nothing more than traditions.
IV. IMPACT OF THE NEW REPORT-AND-WAIT RULES: THE
GOVERNMENT'S SHOWING ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF
SUCCESS
In light of the complexity of antitrust litigation, the FTC has is-
sued a very comprehensive report form designed to obtain any and all
information that may be useful in seeking preliminary relief.170 The
FTC has required that the reporting firm disclose the extent of its hold-
ings after the planned acquisition; the structure of its domestic corpo-
rate family; its products, sales and revenues; and the securities it has
issued or holds. Further, the reporting form demands copies of all
surveys, analyses or similar studies conducted in preparation for the
acquisition.' 7 ' While this last requirement may be difficult to enforce,
particularly if the studies emphasize antitrust aspects of the acquisi-
tion, 72 it does serve as an accurate indicator of the depth of the FTC's
investigation under the new rules. Finally, the reporting statute merely
requires substantial compliance, 73 but the FTC's reporting rules are
satisfied only by total compliance, as the Commission has held the re-
quirements to the minimum necessary for effective enforcement. 74
nying notes 163-65 supra. The Culbro approach-with its requirement that the government show
probability of actual harm to trigger the substantial questions test-may in fact be the only way to
incorporate Sonesla into government suits. If the government shows only serious and substantial
questions, it must also show actual harm. In Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., 5
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 62,393 (N.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,405 (2d Cir.
1978), the district court, in applying Sonesta, considered the government's showing of irreparable
injury. The Second Circuit, however, questioned the standards used below, pointing out that the
government need not make the showing required of a private plaintiff. The best solution to the
problem of presumptions of public injury may be to abandon Sonesta entirely in government
suits.
169. FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
170. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,443 (Aug. 4, 1978). See United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F.
Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), afl'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963), for a listing of the types of information
the government has usually sought but has had difficulty in obtaining.
171. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,447 (Aug. 4, 1978).
172. Item 4(c) of the report form requires copies of "all studies, surveys, analyses and reports
... prepared 'by or for any officer(s) or director(s)'... for the purpose of evaluating or analyz-
ing the acquisition." Id. 33,525. The requirement that the studies be done by or for officers or
directors opens a rather large loophole; a report nominally done by or for someone other than an
officer or director may cross the desks of all officers and directors.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g)(2) (1976).
174. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,508-09 (July 31, 1978).
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The meaning of total compliance is uncertain; the FTC requests infor-
mation which the reporting firm may or may not have, particularly as
to the extent of overlap in sales or operations of acquiring and acquired
firms. Supplemented by the FTC's powers to delay or extend the wait-
ing period and to request additional information, 7 5 however, the re-
port form should be able to reach all relevant information.
The data required under the regulations is exactly that which
courts have considered important in determining the government's
likelihood of success on the merits. The language of the Clayton Act-
"where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly" 76-- controls in the court's evaluation of the
probability of success. Thus, courts look first to the relevant product
lines, the relevant geographic market, and the firms' quantity of sales
and market share of that product.177 All this information will be read-
ily available to the enforcement agencies through the new reporting
rules and market census data from government sources or from private
industrial associations.17 Courts then proceed to consider these find-
ings in light of other evidence: first, whether the merger is primarily
vertical, horizontal or conglomerate in nature; second, the firms' com-
bined share of market resources and sales; third, the degree of concen-
tration of production in the industry; fourth, any trend toward
concentration in the industry; fifth, difficulty of entry into the industry;
sixth, elimination of a substantial competitor; and finally, possible de-
velopment of reciprocal relationships due to increase in market
power. 79 A brief analysis of the new reporting form shows that it has
been designed to deal with these issues.
The first item on the report form requires no more than identifica-
tion of the reporting firm and responses to a series of questions in a
checklist format; items two and three, however, are far more extensive,
requesting a detailed description of the acquisition. Basically, these
175. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (1976).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
177. E.g., United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a f'd sub
non. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971).
178. See U.S. BuREAU OF CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURERS (1972); U.S. BUREAU
OF CENSUS, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANUFACTURERS; U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT INDUS-
TRIAL REPORTS.
179. E.g., FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 524 (3d Cir. 1963) (also considering power to finance extended opera-
tions, completeness of product lines offered and ability to finance consumer purchases); United
States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a 'd ub noim Bartlett v.




items are designed to elicit information concerning the nature and ex-
tent of the control the acquiring firm will have after the acquisition.
The antitrust agencies should have little difficulty with questions of
control in the courts. Only acquisitions of more than fifteen percent of
the assets or outstanding stock or acquisitions valued at more than $15
million are subject to the reporting requirements. The courts will ac-
cept this level of ownership as adequate to bring the Clayton Act into
play. 8 The only problem here lies in distinguishing between acquisi-
tions made to influence the management policies of the acquired firm
and those made solely for investment purposes or in the normal course
of business. Because the latter types of acquisitions are specifically ex-
empted from the reporting requirements, 18 there may be some disa-
greement concerning the intent of the acquiring party. Such issues,
however, rarely reach the litigation stage.'8 2
Items four and six of the report form examine the fiscal perform-
ance, the corporate structure and the securities base of the acquiring
firm. Item four requires the reporting firm to submit copies of SEC
registration documents, 18 3 annual reports, audits, surveys and studies
prepared in planning the merger. This information, particularly the
firm's internal memoranda, will aid the enforcement agencies in devel-
oping cases involving the potential entrant or toehold acquisition theo-
ries.'84 This information may also be used to counter the failing-
company defense.'8 5 Item six requires the reporting firm to disclose all
180. National Supply Co. v. Hillman, 57 F. Supp. 4, 7 (W.D. Pa. 1944); see HousE REPORT
23-24 (additional views of Rep. John Seiberling) (recommending 10% limit as adequate to show
control).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9) (1976) (subject to a 10% ceiling); 15 U.S.C. § 18a()(ll) (1976) (ap-
plicable only to banks, banking associations, trust companies, investment companies and insur-
ance companies).
182. But see FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973).
183. All of the following, if filed with the SEC within three years prior to filing of notification,
must be included in Item 4: the most recent proxy statement, the most recent Form 10-K, all
registration statements, all Forms 10-Q and 8-K and, if a tender offer, Schedule 14D-1. See 43
Fed. Reg. 34,447 (Aug. 4, 1978).
184. See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977). Arco attempted to
merge with a giant in the copper industry, the Anaconda Company. The two firms were not
competitors. Under the potential entrant theory, however, the FTC could establish an antitrust
violation by showing that "butfor the merger, Arco could reasonably be expected ... to become
an entrant into these markets and areas of competition." Id. at 292. As Anaconda was a leader in
copper markets, the FTC also argued that in order to preserve competition Arco should enter the
industry with a toehold acquisition; that is, "market entry by acquisition of a smaller firm already
present in the market." Id. at 293 n.4. The court was not receptive to either theory at the prelimi-
nary stage of the litigation, requiring "strict proof of any anticompetitive effect." Id. at 295.
185. In order to set up the "failing company" defense to a Clayton § 7 charge, the defendant
must show that the resources of the acquired firm were "so depleted and the prospect of rehabili-
tiation so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure." International Shoe Co.
v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930). The defendant must also show that the acquiring company is
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entities within its corporate "family," all major shareholders, and all
holdings from issuers outside the parent and its subsidiaries. These re-
quirements will operate to bring out any possible anticompetitive ef-
fects that may result when different branches of a large firm, or various
holdings in a large corporate or personal portfolio, begin to overlap in
production.
Courts have been most concerned with the information provided
in items five, seven, eight and nine. Under item five, the reporting firm
must disclose dollar revenues from each manufacturing industry in
which it participates, from each product that it manufactures, from
each product class and from each non-manufacturing industry. This
information will then be correlated with manufacturing census data to
determine the firm's market share in relevant lines of commerce-the
single most important factor in antimerger litigation.186 Item seven re-
quests that the reporting firm list all states where it does business in any
industry in which both the acquiring and acquired persons participate.
This data will assist the Commission and the Antitrust Division in es-
tablishing the relevant geographic markets for purposes of analyzing
the horizontal aspects of the proposed acquisition. The eighth item re-
quires the reporting person to describe any vendor-vendee relationships
among the merging firms, thus providing the agencies with a data base
to determine the extent of vertical integration involved in the proposed
acqusition. Finally, item nine requires a list of prior acquisitions in
industries where the present merger involves horizontal integration.
This information will be useful in showing a trend toward concentra-
tion or an attempt to monopolize.'
87
The most serious problem with the current reporting system is the
use of the standard industrial classification codes188 to define manufac-
the "only available purchaser." Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969). See
also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). In General Dynamics the
depletion of the reserves of the acquired coal-mining firm was held inadequate to raise the "failing
company" defense but was sufficient to defeat the government's showing of a substantial lessening
of competition in long-term contracts. Id. at 508. The acquired firm, having committed substan-
tially all of its reserves on prior contracts, was no longer an effective competitor for future con-
tracts. Id.
For examples of the use of the failing company defense in government actions brought prior
to a merger's consummation, see United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975)
("failing company" defense inapposite where there were several alternative merger partners; Gen-
eral Dynamics defense not available on facts) (merger voluntarily delayed pending final hearing)
and United States v. Gimbel Bros., 202 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (acquisition not likely
substantially to lessen competition where business of acquired department store chain was declin-
ing and where firm had been forced to impair its working capital) (preliminary injunction denied).
186. See cases cited in note 179 supra.
187. See, eg., FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1973).
188. Four-digit (SIC code) industry level: 1972 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION
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turing and non-manufacturing industries, products and product classes.
The identification codes were not designed to set out lines of commerce
for antitrust purposes, and their accuracy in determining whether in-
dustries or products are competitive is doubtful. There is also a prob-
lem of characterization under the codes, as it may be possible to mask
anticompetitive effects by identifying similar, competitive products
with different code numbers.18 9 The problem is not insoluble: enforce-
ment agencies may eventually find it necessary to have products identi-
fied with technical language that is standard in the trade.
The new reporting requirements will definitely aid the government
in its showing of a likelihood of success. Firms planning an acquisition
or merger will no longer have any reason to delay in replying to civil
investigative demands; in fact, firms will have every reason to satisfy
the enforcement agencies in order to trigger the start of the statutory
waiting period. 90 The Commission and the Justice Department will
have the option to request additional information during the waiting
period,19 1 but the agencies will have most of the necessary material at
the beginning of the thirty-day period. Problems with the current re-
porting form may be resolved either by requests for additional infor-
mation in order to clarify the initial report or by alterations in the
reporting form to require more specific identification of industries and
products.19 2 Consequently, the government will have a full and fair
MANUAL (Appendix B of 2 1972 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURERS) (Executive Office of the President,
Office of Management and Budget). Five-digit (SIC-based code) product class and seven-digit
(SIC-based code) product: (1) "Numerical List of Manufactured Products," 1972 CENSUS OF
MANUFACTURERS (MC72-1.2) (New 1972 SIC basis); (2) "Industry Statistics," 2 1972 CENSUS
OF MANUFACTURERS. Five-digit (SIC-based code) product class: "Product Class Reference List,"
INSTRUCTION MANUAL FOR THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANUFACTURERS. Seven-digit (SIC-based
code) product: "Product Reference Lists," INSTRUCTION MANUAL, CURRENT INDUSTRIAL RE-
PORTS (monthly, quarterly or annual).
189. The codes, designed for census purposes, allow identification of products by their compo-
sition (metals, plastics, glass, etc.) and by their end use (parts for passenger cars, dinnerware,
household appliances, etc.). Thus, products having many components or multiple uses are diffi-
cult to classify. For example, spark plugs could be placed in a number of categories: 3694411
(automobile spark plugs); 3694431 (other type spark plugs); 3519915 (parts and accessories for
internal combustion engines); 3714198 (parts for passenger cars); 35249311 (parts for
lawnmowers); etc. While the Census Bureau could expect little dishonesty in the use of these
codes, the FTC and the Justice Department may not be so fortunate, as reporting firms may wish
to deemphasize anticompetitive impact. Also, the codes ignore producr interchangeability.
Merging firms may be manufacturing products with vastly different end uses, but the cost of
switching over to product lines having the same end use may be minimal. Again, anticompetitive
impact would not be revealed by the standard industrial classification codes.
190. See United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), a'd, 320 F.2d 509
(3d Cir. 1963).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (1976).
192. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(2) (1976) (creating rule-making power); 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (1976)
(allowing requests for additional information and waiting period extension); 15 U.S.C. § 18a(j)
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opportunity to prepare an adequate showing. 19 3
Given the current state of the law governing the preliminary in-
junction-its delicate balance between various standards on the re-
quired showing of likelihood of success-the question inevitably arises
whether the reporting requirements will influence courts in either direc-
tion. It seems clear that any influence should be toward the reasonable
probability standard. The government will now have access to all nec-
essary data; it has a minimum of thirty days to prepare a showing of
reasonable probability that the acquisition may tend to lessen competi-
tion.'9 4 The reporting rules should have no effect on private antitrust
suits, but the liberal showing of the Sonesta test seems more readily
applicable to private plaintiffs in any case. The Sonesta test has led to
hesitation or confusion when applied in government suits where pre-
sumptions of harm control. Furthermore, the substantial questions test
has proved particularly attractive when the issues are too complex to be
handled in depth in a preliminary proceeding. The notification re-
quirements, however, should enable the government to show a reason-
able probability of success despite complicated issues and despite the
preliminary nature of the proceeding. If the government cannot make
a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, it is doubtful that an
injunction should issue.
The legislative history of the Antitrust Improvements Act states
that the reporting requirements were not intended to change the sub-
stantive rules governing preliminary injunctions.'95 In view of the un-
stable state of the law, however, no such change is necessary. A court
may simply choose to follow one line of cases-that requiring a reason-
able probability of success-rather than another line applying
Sonesta's dual standard. In fact, the legislative history assumes that
the reasonable probability standard prevails in all circuits. 196 Although
(1976) (requiring FTC to report to Congress and to include recommendations for revision of sec-
tion).
193. See note 41 supra. See Senate Hearings, pt. III, at 72 (statement of Eleanor Fox) ("Hav-
ing this information, the Government will be well situated to get preliminary relief where it is
reasonably likely to prevail. When the Government's case is so thin that it is not likely to prevail,
we [the ABA's Antitrust Section] believe merging companies should have the right to consummate
the transactions").
194. HousE REPORT 7 ("Thus, both Congress and the courts have repeatedly emphasized that
section 7 is an 'incipiency' statute: It is intended to halt monopolies and restraints of trade in their
initial stages, before they ripen into full-scale Sherman Act violations.... mhe government
carries the burden of proof in premerger injunction proceedings, and must demonstrate a 'reason-
able probability that it will prevail on the merits of its Clayton Act challenge'" (footnote omit-
ted)).
195. HousE REPORT 8.
196. Eg., id 7; Senate Hearings, pt. H, at 1001 (letter from Thomas Kauper to Senator Hart).
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the House Report characterizes the standard as steep because the test is
frequently the same as that required for final relief,19 7 Congress chose
not to alter the test-as was certainly within its power-but to seek a
less drastic solution. Whether the statute will have any impact on the
current liberal trend is yet to be determined, but any reaction by the
courts should be in the direction of retreat rather than further liberali-
zation.
V. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW REPORT-AND-WAIT RULES: THE
GOVERNMENT'S SHOWING ON THE EQUITIES
Courts weighing the equities often turn to expressions of public
policy contained in statutes or legislative history in order to resolve dif-
ficulties in measuring the public interest; furthermore, the courts taking
this approach have usually found the public interest to be para-
mount.' A great deal of legislative history lies behind the new stat-
ute, 19 9 and it is quite likely that courts will look to congressional
statements on the purpose and intent of the Act. Again, no change in
substantive law is necessary. A court need only emphasize legislative
concern with the agencies' failures to prevent anticompetitive mergers
and with the inadequacy of divestiture in order to tip the equities de-
cidedly in the government's favor.2°
A superficial examination of the legislative history may well con-
vince a court that the public interest is of such magnitude as to out-
weigh any private harm. Antitrust laws have long been held to protect
an especially important public interest; the prevailing attitude is that
"democracy can be preserved only by dispersing and decentralizing ec-
onomic and financial power."' 20 ' Congress has been particularly solici-
tous-if not always perfectly rational-in guarding against the adverse
effects of anticompetitive behavior.2 "2 In addition, Congress has ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the enforcement agencies' record in
preventing consummation of questionable mergers: "[The weight of
the burden of proof [in antimerger cases], together with the present lack
197. HousE REPORT 7-8.
198. Eg., FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot, 547
F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1977); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
199. Senate Hearingr, HousE REPORT, 122 CONG. REc. HI0,293-94 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976)
(remarks of Rep. Rodino); id. S15,416-20 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1976) (Senator Hart's post-debate
"Additional Statement"; remarks of Sen. Percy); id. S14,889 (daily ed. Aug. 27, 1976) (remarks of
Sen. Hart).
200. E.g., FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
201. HousE REPORT 7.




of any premerger notification and waiting requirements, has meant that
many large and illegal mergers have been successfully consummated in
recent years, before the government had any realistic chance to chal-
lenge them. '2°3  After consummation of the merger, divestiture has
proved inadequate to restore the competitive environment; 20 4 the pub-
lic interest can only be protected by more effective preliminary relief.
Thomas Kauper,2 °5 in enumerating the benefits of the new report-
and-wait rules, pointed out that preliminary relief has been far more
effective than divestiture.20 6 Joseph Brodley2°7 elaborated on this issue:
"The only significant exception to this bleak remedial picture occurs in
those relatively few cases in which the government has been able to
obtain advance injunctive relief staying the merger pending the resolu-
tion of the cases." 2 8 The House Report accepted this analysis, citing
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.209 and United States v. Paper-
craft Corp. 210 as examples of divestiture's failure to protect the public
interest and United States v. Amax, Inc.,21 where the firms voluntarily
delayed the merger pending final decision, as a model of success. 2
A court considering the history of the legislation might be influ-
enced to grant a preliminary injunction on the ground that the public
will suffer serious injury in the interim prior to final decision. Further,
once the equities tip decisively in favor of the government, the lesser
standard of Sonesta is applicable. Thus, the government's burden is
lightened on both points. The courts, reluctant to gamble that a dives-
tible entity will be in existence after final disposition, may move further
203. HOUSE REPORT 8.
204. See notes 4, 42-43 supra.
205. Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
206. Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 96. There are a number of benefits associated with the new
notification statute: first, facilitating preliminary relief; second, notice of challenge to merging
companies prior to consummation; third, prevention of midnight mergers; and finally, early com-
pilation of basic data necessary for effective enforcement. Id. Kauper also enumerated six rea-
sons for the inadequacy of divestiture: first, the assets of the firms have become hopelessly
entangled by the time a divestiture order is entered; second, the personnel of the acquired firm
may have undergone substantial turnover and those employees who have remained may have
changed loyalties; third, the goodwill of the acquired firm may have shifted to the acquiring firm;
fourth, divestiture is a slow process, usually taking years to complete; fifth, an interim change in
market conditions often makes restoration of the premerger status quo impossible-a suitable
buyer may or may not be found; and finally, firms often deliberately delay divestiture, stalling so
as to reap all possible profits from the merger. Id.
207. Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
208. Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 506.
209. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
210. 393 F. Supp. 408 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
211. 402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975).
212. HousE REPORT 10.
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toward a pro forma approach to the preliminary injunction.213
The courts, however, must be cautious in adopting this type of ap-
proach, in view of legislative history indicating that Congress wished
the courts to maintain broad discretion in issuing preliminary injunc-
tions. As noted earlier, Congress rejected the automatic stay provision
in the original Senate bill.214 As Senator Percy stated in debate, "[A]
number of mergers . . . which are clearly in the public interest...
would be prevented or discouraged. In some cases years of hard work
in planning a merger will have been for naught. Ineffectual or incom-
petent management. . . may be kept in power at the expense of public
shareholders, consumers and the Government. '2 15 Percy's statement
reflects congressional concern with private, corporate injury and with
the fundamental public interest in preserving liquidity in the assets
market. In fact, Congress rejected not only the automatic stay but also
an alternative proposal which would have merely shifted the burden of
proof to the defendants.216 The legislature clearly realized that
"[m]aintenance of a free market for capital assets is essential in the long
run to combat inflation; to that end, it is important that more efficient
companies be permitted to acquire the less efficient." 217 The Second
Circuit has agreed in principle that the courts must avoid any broad
interpretation of Clayton Act section 7 that would "damage seriously
the market for capital assets" or "interfere materially with mergers that
are procompetitive. ' 21 s
Business interests have been even more forceful and eloquent in
justifying merger activity. A letter from the Securities Industry Associ-
ation to Senator Hart offers an excellent summary of the benefits of
procompetitive mergers:
The free flow of capital permits companies to grow and prosper and
to provide goods, services, and jobs. Mergers and acquisitions...
play an important role in this capital allocation process. Such activi-
ties strengthen competition and competitors. They provide a mecha-
nism whereby participants who choose to leave the market can do so,
while new competitors can enter. Business founders can reap the re-
213. See Note, supra note 18, at 170.
214. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra.
215. CONG. REC., supra note 52.
216. Senate Hearings, pt. III, at 71 (statement of Eleanor Fox) ("Senator Scott and Hart have
proposed an amendment [to section 501(d) of S. 1284 .... The preliminary injunction would
issue unless defendants show that the Government does not have a reasonable probability of suc-
cess on the merits or that defendants will be irreparably injured by loss other than loss of benefits
of the transaction. The burden on defendants would be a hard one indeed.... ."). Of course, the
compromise bill finally enacted contained no such provision. HousE REPORT 8.
217. Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 530 (statement of Robert Longman).
218. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974).
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wards of their development efforts. Unsuccessful competitors can
limit their losses. Diversified companies can release inefficient or un-
suitable segments of their enterprises. New groups can assume lead-
ership roles of public companies (or at least keep current
management on its toes) by the tender offer mechanism, thus assur-
ing innovation and change.219
Corporate representatives emphasized the point that "the great major-
ity of merger-type transactions are economically healthy"22 and that
"government agencies only attack mergers in a small number of
cases." 221 While the corporate testimony is clearly in the nature of a
lobbying effort, the risk of discouraging lawful mergers cannot be dis-
counted; the courts must avoid too liberal an approach in issuing pre-
liminary injunctions against mergers.
In weighing the equities, the courts must consider not only private
harm, but also two countervailing components of the public interest.
The courts must guard against too heavy a concentration of market
power. As a House task force concluded: "Increasing sectors of our
economy have become alarmingly vulnerable to monopoly and effec-
tive oligopoly. . . .We have witnessed the systematic development of
planned obsolescence in a variety of products and a growing tendency
to reduce output rather than prices. ' 222 Congress has demanded that
courts prevent the effective repeal of the "fundamental laws of the com-
petitive marketplace."" 3 On the other hand, courts must weigh the
public interest in a free market for capital assets, where entry and exit
from industries are relatively free from government regimentation. If
219. Senate Hearings, pt. II, at 1033.
There is a serious question whether free enterprise can survive this kind of government
dictation of the size, shape, structure, and mode of operation of the economy. Pricing
policies, marketing procedures, and capital arrangements and rearrangements are the
essence of our system. When these matters are controlled by the decisions of administra-
tive agencies. . ., rather than by men staking their fortunes on their ability to serve
consumers, the result is the corporative state. Antitrust principles are now being pursued
to the bitter end. Had they been pushed so far at the start, the economy would have been
frozen in a relatively primitive cast.. . and beyond much doubt, nowhere near the
technological progress, the wages, or the standard of living that now prevails.
Petro, The Growing Threat of Antitrust, FORTUNE, Nov. 1962, at 128. See Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319-20 (1962) ("Congress recognized the stimulation to competition
that might flow from particular mergers ..... Taken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates
congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors, and its desire to restrain
mergers only to the extent that such combinations may tend to lessen competition." (emphasis in
original)).
220. Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 165 (statement of J. Randolph Wilson on behalf of U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce).
221. Id. 529.
222. Handler, supra note 202, at 218 n.33 (quoting H.R. TAsK FORCE REP., "To Revive the
Economy: A Congressional Program of Action," reprinted in DAILY LABOR REP. No. 8 (BNA), at
Y-l, Y-4 (Jan. 13, 1975)).
223. Id.
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Adam Smith's "invisible hand" is to guide the American market-
place,224 it cannot be manacled by protracted delay and unnecessary
interference from the government agencies.
The legislative history of the report-and-wait statute illustrates the
conflict between these two components of public interest. Congress
carefully balanced these countervailing considerations and concluded
that the courts should be allowed to retain broad discretion in issuing
preliminary injunctions. Courts weighing the equities should be as
careful as Congress was in drafting the legisation. The federal courts
should be aware of the need for mergers and acquisitions to move
freely and quickly; they should be sensitive to the likelihood that pre-
liminary relief will create an insuperable bar to a proposed merger.
Congress rejected the automatic stay and a shift in the burden of proof;
the courts should avoid a pro forma approach or a burdensome pre-
sumption in the government's favor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal courts should take a cautious approach in issuing prelimi-
nary injunctions against mergers under the expedited procedure of the
new report-and-wait statute. The Sonesta approach may be useful in
private litigation, but its appearance in government suits has led to con-
fusion regarding the standards to be applied in granting or refusing
injunctive relief. Coitemporary developments on the equities make
Sonesta inappropriate in government suits. The circuit courts may re-
treat to the reasonable probability standard, secure in the knowledge
that the government will have early access to all information necessary
to show a likelihood of.success. The Fourth Circuit's refusal to weigh
private injury under section 13(b) should be reexamined in light of the
legislative history of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, since
224. 1 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
456 (Oxford 1976) (1st ed. London 1776). Smith's views on government regulation may be anti-
quated:
The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought
to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention,
but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but
to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the
hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.
Id. The wisdom in his metaphor, however, endures:
[E]very individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as
great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it.... [File intends only his own gain, and he is
in this, as in many other cases, ledby an invisible hand to promote an end which was no
part of his intention. . . . By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Congress did express concern for private hardships. Courts which have
taken a similar approach should be more hesitant to conclude that the
public interest always outweighs private harm; Congress did not intend
that the Commission and the Antitrust Division fashion a model econ-
omy based on the agencies' conception of the public interest. Congress
apparently concluded that preliminary injunctive relief is still a drastic
remedy, and the courts should follow the policy ultimately adopted by
the legislature after years of careful consideration and compromise: a
conservative approach to the use of the preliminary injunction in anti-
trust cases.
Rudolf p. Beuttenmuller
